Race Inequity Fifty Years Later: Language Rights Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by Gonzales Rose, Jasmine
Boston University School of Law 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law 
Faculty Scholarship 
2014 
Race Inequity Fifty Years Later: Language Rights Under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 
Jasmine Gonzales Rose 
Boston University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Law and Race Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jasmine Gonzales Rose, Race Inequity Fifty Years Later: Language Rights Under the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 6 Alabama Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law Review 167 (2014). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/995 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship 
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at 
Boston University School of Law. For more information, 
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu. 




Legal Studies Research Paper Series 








Race Inequity Fifty Years Later: 
Language Rights Under the 

















University of Pittsburgh School of Law 
3900 Forbes Avenue 






This paper can be downloaded without charge from the  
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2627306 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2627306
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2627306 
RACE INEQUITY FIFTY YEARS LATER: LANGUAGE RIGHTS UNDER THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964  
 




The occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 gives pause to consider whether the Act has been effective in 
eradicating discrimination against people of color. Much has changed over 
the past fifty years. In 1964, it would have been difficult to imagine an 
African American president and the end of de jure racial restrictions in 
employment, education, voting, jury service, and places of public 
accommodation. However, as the old French expression goes: plus ça 
change, plus c’est la même chose—the more things change, the more they 
stay the same.1 
Racial discrimination still exists in 2014, but it manifests itself 
differently. In view of this, it is imperative that the civil rights laws of 
yesterday are equipped to address the race problems of today. Over the past 
half-century, both racial demographics and the manner in which racism is 
expressed in the United States have changed. Expressions of racism have 
become more subtle and sophisticated.2 Rather than explicitly barring 
someone from employment, education, public accommodations, and civic 
participation on the basis of his or her race, racially discriminatory exclusion 
is often couched in seemingly race-neutral terms.3 Such racially 
discriminatory practices often go unremedied because current colorblind 
legal jurisprudence is increasingly formalistic and frequently refuses to look 
beyond the surface of inequitable acts to reveal the underlying discriminatory 
impetus.4  
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I am grateful 
to the University of Pittsburgh School of Law’s Derrick A. Bell Fund for 
Excellence Award and its Bell Fellow, Megan Block, for providing research 
assistance and support for this project. I am also indebted to Andrea Freeman, 
James Gonzales, Benjamin Minegar, and Grace Miclot for their feedback. 
1 JEAN-BAPTISTE ALPHONSE KARR, LES GUÊPES (Jan. 1849).  
2 Kevin R. Johnson, Driver’s Licenses and Undocumented Immigrants: The Future 
of Civil Rights Law?, 5 NEV. L.J. 213, 216 (2004); see, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence 
III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 
39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 331, 340–41 (1987). 
3 Johnson, supra note 2, at 235. 
4 Adherents of “colorblindness” define racial discrimination as either on-its-face 
racial exclusion or racial classification or recognition of any kind, whether it be for 
6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2015). 
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Another change is that, while in 1964 African Americans were the 
largest racial minority,5 today Latinos constitute the largest racial minority 
population in the United States.6 It is often assumed that antidiscrimination 
laws protect all racial groups equally. This Article questions that assumption 
and explores the competence of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was 
enacted to address racism against African Americans, in addressing racial 
discrimination against Latinos by examining the Act’s treatment of language 
discrimination. Racial discrimination is often expressed differently against 
Latinos than it is against African Americans. Most notably, language 
discrimination, which includes discrimination on the basis of actual or 
perceived English-language ability, bilingualism, and accent, is a common 
method of subordinating Latinos.7 For Latinos, language discrimination is not 
simply a linguistic issue; it is frequently a form of discrimination on the basis 
of race and national origin. Language discrimination is challenging to address 
in the courts because English-language requirements are often viewed as 
race-neutral, even when they serve to exclude or subordinate Latinos and 
other racial minorities.8 
This Article focuses on language discrimination in the areas that the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was primarily concerned with: employment, 
education, public accommodations, and civic participation—concentrating, 
in the latter respect, on jury participation. The Civil Rights Act, particularly 
Titles VI and VII, has been the primary federal law used to challenge 
                                                 
the purposes of race-based exclusion or affirmative action. Colorblind 
jurisprudence imposes a literal “anti-differentiation principle” whereby 
“discrimination is defined so narrowly that it is virtually impossible to advance a 
constitutionally [or statutorily] cognizable claim of racial discrimination . . . .” 
Cedric Merlin Powell, Schools, Rhetorical Neutrality, and the Failure of the 
Colorblind Equal Protection Clause, 10 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 362, 378 
(2008). 
5 Carlo A. Pedrioli, Respecting Language as Part of Ethnicity: Title VII and 
Language Discrimination at Work, 27 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 97, 
102 n.42 (2011).  
6 Jorge M. Chavez et al., Sufren Los Niños: Exploring the Impact of Unauthorized 
Immigration Status on Children’s Well-Being, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 638, 638 (2012). 
7 See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, Buscando América: Why Integration and Equal 
Protection Fail to Protect Latinos, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1432–34 (2004) 
[hereinafter Buscando América]. 
8 See Laura M. Goodall, Comment, The “Otherized” Latino: Edward Said’s 
Orientalism Theory and Reforming Suspect Class Analysis, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
835, 847 (2014) (quoting Andrew P. Averbach, Language Classifications and the 
Equal Clause Protection Clause: When Is Language a Pretext for Race or 
Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 481, 499 (1994)). 
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language discrimination in the United States. Regulations promulgated and 
cases decided under Title VI and VII have been ahead of constitutional 
jurisprudence in recognizing that language discrimination is a form of 
national origin and, at times, race discrimination.9 However, the Act has 
ultimately proved ineffectual in redressing language inequity for several 
reasons.  
This Article examines the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s treatment of 
language discrimination and suggests ways that the Act can better protect 
against such discrimination. Part I explores the differences and similarities 
between race discrimination in 1964 and today and looks at language 
discrimination as an example of contemporary race discrimination against 
Latinos. Part II examines language discrimination in the areas of 
employment; education; public accommodations; and the courts, particularly 
jury service; as well as the availability of protection against such 
discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It evaluates both the Act’s 
deficiencies and its untapped potential in combating language discrimination. 
Part III examines structural problems with the Act that have limited its 
effectiveness in eradicating language discrimination.  
  
I. RACE & LANGUAGE DISCRIMINATION: YESTERDAY & TODAY 
 
In evaluating race inequity fifty years after the enactment of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, it is important to consider the changing face of racial 
discrimination and racial demographics in the United States. In 1964, the 
largest racial minority group was African Americans.10 Jim Crow laws 
overtly discriminated against African Americans, relegating them to separate 
public schools and public facilities and denying opportunities to participate 
in democratic self-government activities, such as voting and jury service.11 
In 2014, Latinos are the largest racial minority.12 Racial discrimination 
persists today but is less conspicuous. Rather than hanging signs that say “No 
Negros” or “No Mexicans,” racial exclusions are doled out in “race-neutral” 
code. One example of these racially discriminatory but purportedly race-
neutral exclusions is English-language requirements. Under current 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, Accommodating Linguistic Difference: Toward 
a Comprehensive Theory of Language Rights in the United States, 36 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 133, 190 (2001). 
10 Pedrioli, supra note 5, at 102 n.42. 
11 See Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Racial Double Helix: Watson, Crick, and 
Brown v. Board of Education (Our No-Bell Prize Award Speech), 47 HOW. L.J. 
473, 483 (2004); Barbara Y. Welke, Beyond Plessy: Space, Status, and Race in the 
Era of Jim Crow, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 267, 273 (2000). 
12 Pedrioli, supra note 5, at 102 n.42. 
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“colorblind” jurisprudence, a sign outside a restaurant stating “No Mexicans 
or Dogs Allowed” (as was prevalent in the Southwest in the 1950s and 
1960s)13 would be unlawful and condemned by the majority of Americans. 
However, a sign stating “English only,” even when the common 
understanding is that in practice it means “No Spanish” and hence “No 
Latinos,” may survive legal scrutiny and even be celebrated by many 
Americans as patriotic.14 Similarly, prospective jurors could not overtly be 
excluded from service on the basis of their race,15 but language ability (either 
limited English proficiency or full bilingual ability) can serve as a basis 
whereby Latino citizens and other minorities can be excluded.16  
Language-based restrictions have long been a tool used to subordinate 
Latinos.17 In the Jim Crow era, African Americans were segregated in schools 
throughout the South and other regions of the United States on the basis of 
their race.18 Latinos were also subjected to race-based educational 
segregation, but this segregation was veiled under the pretext of language. 
For instance, in the Southwest, Mexican American children were segregated 
in separate “Mexican” schools or “Mexican” classrooms within white schools 
on the purported basis of their deficient English-language skills.19 However, 
these students’ English-language abilities and consequent assignment to a 
Mexican school or classroom were frequently determined not on the basis of 
linguistic skill, but rather simply on their Mexican appearance or Spanish 
                                                 
13 See REYNALDO ANAYA VALENCIA ET AL., MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE LAW 
8 (Adela de la Torre ed., 2004); Antonia Castañeda, Language and Other Lethal 
Weapons: Cultural Politics and the Rites of Children as Translators of Culture, 19 
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 229, 234 (1998); see generally CYNTHIA E. OROZCO, 
NO MEXICANS, WOMEN OR DOGS ALLOWED: THE RISE OF THE MEXICAN 
AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2009).  
14 See Pedrioli, supra note 5, at 102 n.42; Rodríguez, supra note 9, at 220–21. 
15 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879), abrogated by Taylor v. 
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
16 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991). 
17 Buscando América, supra note 7, at 1432–34. 
18 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
19 See Mendez v. Westminster Sch. Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946), aff’d, 
161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947); Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Salvatierra, 33 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1930); Robert R. Álvarez, Jr., The Lemon Grove Incident: The Nation’s 
First Successful Desegregation Court Case, 32 J. SAN DIEGO HIST. 116, 116 
(1986), available at http://sandiegohistory.org/journal/86spring/lemongrove.htm 
(citing Petition for Writ of Mandate, Álvarez v. Lemon Grove Sch. Dist. (No. 
66625) (1931)); see also Lupe S. Salinas, Linguaphobia, Language Rights, and the 
Right of Privacy, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 53, 63–65 (2007) [hereinafter 
Linguaphobia]. 
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surname.20 The segregated Mexican schools or Mexican classrooms offered 
substandard facilities and instruction,21 and sometimes even lacked any 
teachers at all.22  
Today, English-language requirements, although race-neutral on their 
face, are often prompted by racial animus against Latinos. English-only laws 
are habitually brought about in response to popular movements driven by a 
“mission[] of ‘race betterment,’” “questions about the intelligence and values 
of Latin American immigrants,” and a “fear of a Hispanic takeover.”23 
However, despite racist, nativist, and xenophobic beginnings, legislative 
history and statutory language do not mention Latinos or the Spanish 
language. This is not surprising; overtly acknowledging the primary targets 
of the bill would be legally and politically objectionable. Nonetheless, there 
is frequently a common understanding that, in both original intent and 
application, “English-only” rules and statutes are often intended to be “No-
Spanish” restrictions.24 These rules are generally less about a genuine 
preference for English than a means to limit Spanish usage, exclude Spanish 
speakers, and make Latinos of all linguistic backgrounds feel unwelcome.25 
Language discrimination affects Latinos of diverse socioeconomic, 
citizenship, immigration, and language backgrounds. Latinos may be 
                                                 
20 Mendez, 64 F. Supp. at 550. 
21 Meaghan Field, Voting Equality and Educational Equality: Is The Former 
Possible Without the Latter and Are Bilingual Ballots a Sensible Response to 
Education Discrimination?, 17 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 385, 389 
n.21 (2011). 
22 My grandfather, Rafael L. Gonzales, reports that in Southern Colorado, in some 
instances, white students were placed in Mexican classrooms, but only as a serious 
form of punishment. Interview with Rafael L. Gonzales, La Junta, Co. (July 14, 
2014). 
23 Philip C. Aka & Lucinda M. Deason, Culturally Competent Public Services and 
English-Only Laws, 53 HOW. L.J. 53, 85 n.207 (2009) (citing Thomas Ricento’s 
research “based on examination of the internal documents, funding sources and 
written statements of leaders of the English-Only movement”); see generally Juan 
F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural 
Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 356–57 (1992) [hereinafter 
Demography and Distrust]; Lupe S. Salinas, Immigration and Language Rights: 
The Evolution of Private Racist Attitudes into American Public Law and Policy, 7 
NEV. L.J. 895 (2007) [hereinafter Immigration and Language Rights]. 
24 Braden Beard, Note, No Mere “Matter of Choice”: The Harm of Accent 
Preferences and English-Only Rules, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1495, 1506–07 (2013) 
(citing Alfredo Mirandé, “En la Tierra del Ciego, El Tuerto es Rey” (“In the Land 
of the Blind, the One Eyed Person is King”): Bilingualism as a Disability, 26 N.M. 
L. REV. 75, 103 (1996)). 
25 Aka & Deason, supra note 23, at 85–86. 
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discriminated against on the basis of being Limited English Proficient (LEP), 
fully Spanish-English bilingual, or having a Spanish/Hispanic accent. 
Further, due to the problem of perceived foreignness (viewing Latinos as 
foreign irrespective of the duration of their American ancestry or 
nationality),26 Latinos are often discriminated against when they are 
mistakenly perceived as LEP or bilingual or as having an accent even when 
they do not. For example, I come from a Chicano New Mexican family that 
never crossed any border. Rather, the border crossed my family when New 
Mexico became part of the United States pursuant to the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo in 1848. I am a native English speaker who grew up in Oregon in an 
English-speaking household and learned Spanish primarily through classes 
and work abroad. However, throughout my life people have frequently 
assumed I am LEP or speak English with a Spanish accent. For instance, in 
third grade I was placed in special education classes for a nonexistent 
“accent.” As an adult, in several professional settings, colleagues have 
described me as a person with a “heavy Spanish accent,” though I speak 
English with an Oregon/Pacific Northwest accent that is a rather standard 
American accent unassociated with Hispanic background. This phenomenon 
of misperceiving an accent or English-language limitation based solely upon 
a Latina’s physical appearance, surname, or ancestry indicates the close 
relationship between race and language for Latinos. Not only is language 
often central to one’s internal Latino identity,27 it is also a key external racial 
identifier used by others to classify a person as Latino.28  
As the argument that language discrimination can be a form of race 
discrimination is an unfamiliar concept to many, it might be helpful to pause 
and consider the meaning of race and racism, and the intersection of race, 
                                                 
26 See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 11, at 490; Richard Delgado, Derrick 
Bell’s Toolkit–Fit to Dismantle That Famous House?, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 283, 302 
(2000).  
27 Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the García Cousins Lost Their Accents: 
Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules 
as the Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 
CAL. L. REV. 1347, 1364 (1997); Rodríguez, supra note 9, at 141 (noting that 
language “defines the essence of cultural identity”); see Hernandez v. New York, 
500 U.S. 352, 364, 370 (1991) (Even Justices of the United States Supreme Court 
have acknowledged that, for many Latinos, Spanish language is used to “define the 
self,” and “[l]anguage permits an individual to express both a personal identity and 
membership in a community”); J.A. Fishman, Language and Ethnicity, in 
LANGUAGE, ETHNICITY AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 15, 25 (Howard Giles ed., 
1977).  
28 See Yxta Maya Murray, The Latino-American Crisis of Citizenship, 31 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 503, 548 (1998).  
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racism, and the Spanish language for Latinos. In our society, racial groups 
are defined by certain physical or cultural characteristics.29 This differs from 
national origin (the country of one’s or one’s ancestor’s origination) because 
diverse populations are lumped together in broad classifications such as 
white, black, Asian, or Latino instead of recognizing the diversity of national 
origin and other backgrounds of the individuals and their ancestors.30 Racial 
prejudice is the attribution of negative qualities to these identifying 
characteristics.31 Racism is racial prejudice plus power.32 We often see this 
with skin color, hair texture, and phenotype.33 For instance, people with dark 
skin, kinky or curly hair, and certain facial characteristics may be racially 
classified as “black” without regard to their unique ancestry. Racism 
materializes when negative qualities are associated with physical (or cultural) 
traits. An example of this distinction would be when someone sees a person 
with the aforementioned physical characteristics and classifies them as 
“black” and then, without any basis, perceives them to be dangerous, 
intimidating, dishonest, or criminally inclined. The first assumption is one 
about race; the second is racism.  
For Latinos, in addition to physical characteristics, Spanish language 
or accent are attributes used to designate the individuals as a racialized 
collective group of Latinos, Hispanics, or “Mexicans” despite their 
multiplicity of ancestry and other background traits.34 Racism steps into play 
when the use of Spanish is perceived to hold innately negative qualities, such 
as being “dirty,” un-American, abusive, foul, threatening, uneducated, or 
offensive. These racist perceptions about the negative qualities of Spanish are 
then used as a justification for imposing English-only rules. Racism is also 
present when Spanish language or accent is used as a racial proxy to exclude 
or subject the speaker to less favorable treatment. Throughout this Article, 
we will see examples of how Spanish language is used as a proxy for race 
and how Spanish is perceived to possess inherently negative qualities that 
are, in turn, employed to justify English-only policies. 
 Language discrimination affects many Americans. LEP35 persons are 
                                                 
29 Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Language Disenfranchisement in Juries: A Call for 
Constitutional Remediation, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 811, 835 (2014).  
30 Id. at 828. 
31 Id. at 835–40. 
32 Beverly Daniels Tatum, Defining Racism: “Can We Talk?,” RACE, CLASS, AND 
GENDER IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INTEGRATED STUDY 127 (Paula S. Rothenberg 
ed., 6th ed. 2001).  
33 Gonzales Rose, supra note 29, at 835–40. 
34 Id. at 826. 
35 In this essay, a LEP individual is defined as one who “[does] not speak English 
as their primary language and [has] a limited ability to read, speak, write, or 
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the group most frequently and severely affected by language discrimination. 
LEP individuals comprise a significant percentage of the population and are 
predominately people of color, particularly Latinos.36 Nearly ten percent of 
the population in the United States is LEP.37 That is approximately 29.5 
million people.38 There is a tremendous correlation between race and 
English-speaking ability in the United States. The vast majority, 87 percent, 
of LEP individuals are people of color.39 That is about 25.67 million people 
of color, of which an estimated 21 million are Latino.40 Despite popular 
perceptions to the contrary, many LEP individuals are United States citizens. 
A conservative estimate is that 13 million United States citizens are LEP.41  
English-language requirements and preferences exclude and 
subordinate LEP people, particularly Spanish-speaking Latinos, in a variety 
of contexts, including employment, education, domestic relations, access to 
healthcare and public services, and participation in democracy. For example, 
private employers have increasingly imposed “English-only” rules in 
workplaces, which have been applied to humiliate, discipline, and fire 
workers, as well as exclude LEP customers, especially Latinos.42 In public 
                                                 
understand English . . . .” Limited English Proficiency (LEP), LEP.GOV, 
http://www.lep.gov/faqs/faqs.html (last visited June 9, 2015). 
36 MIGRATION POLICY INST., DATA BRIEF: LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENT 
INDIVIDUALS IN THE UNITED STATES: NUMBER, SHARE, GROWTH, AND 
LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY 6 (Dec. 6, 2011), available at 
http://migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/LEPdatabrief.pdf (“Most 
LEP individuals speak Spanish. Spanish-speaking LEP individuals accounted for 
66 percent of the total US LEP population in 2010.”). 
37 Id. at 1. 
38 Id. 
39 PEW HISPANIC CTR., TABLE 20: LANGUAGE SPOKEN AT HOME & ENGLISH-
SPEAKING ABILITY, BY AGE, RACE AND ETHNICITY: 2009 (2011), available at 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2011/02/17/statistical-portrait-of-hispanics-in-the-
united-states-2009/2009-statistical-portrait-23/. 
40 Gonzales Rose, supra note 29, at 814. 
41 Id. 
42 See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1980). Garcia, a bilingual 
employee, was fired for speaking Spanish in an English-only workplace. The Fifth 
Circuit upheld the “English-only” rule, finding it did not impose hardship upon 
Garcia because he was bilingual and capable of speaking English. Id. See also 
Pedrioli, supra note 5, at 97; Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating 
“National Origin” Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 
826–27 (1994) [hereinafter Ethnicity and Prejudice] (discussing how courts of 
appeal fail to recognize language restrictions in the workplace as a form of national 
origin discrimination).  
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schools, students’ violations of English-only rules have resulted in Latino 
students being sent to “Spanish detention” or suspended simply for speaking 
Spanish on school grounds.43 Some courts have even found speaking Spanish 
at home to be a form of child abuse and have threatened to remove custody 
from Latino parents unless they speak English to their children.44 
Furthermore, LEP individuals face significant barriers when it comes to 
accessing healthcare and public services.45 Even the ability to exercise the 
fundamental right to vote can be inhibited when accommodations are not 
provided to LEP citizens.46 Further, LEP citizens are routinely excluded from 
jury service in most jurisdictions.47  
LEP individuals are not the only people subject to language 
discrimination. Bilingual persons, particularly bilingual Latinos, are also 
affected. A recent study revealed that 38 percent of Latinos in the United 
States are “Spanish dominant, 38 percent are bilingual and 24 percent are 
English dominant.”48 This is not merely an immigrant issue. Nearly half of 
United States-born Latinos are not English dominant.49 Widespread LEP 
language-based exclusions, coupled with accent and bilingualism 
discrimination, affect a large number of Latinos and other people of color in 
the United States but are often left out of discussions about race 
discrimination. In pondering whether the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been 
effective in curtailing race discrimination, it is important that the topic of 
language discrimination finds a place in the discussion. 
 
II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 & LANGUAGE DISCRIMINATION  
 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, most notably Titles VI and VII, is the 
primary source of law utilized to challenge English-only policies and other 
                                                 
43 Buscando América, supra note 7, at 1443; Mirandé, supra note 24, at 103. 
44 Buscando América, supra note 7, at 1445. 
45 Siddharth Khanijou, Note, Rebalancing Healthcare Inequities: Language 
Service Reimbursement May Ensure Meaningful Access to Care for LEP Patients, 
9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 855, 857 (2005). 
46 Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, ¡Su Voto Es Su Voz! Incorporating Voters of Limited 
English Proficiency into American Democracy, 48 B.C. L. REV. 251 (2007). 
47 Gonzales Rose, supra note 29, at 815. 
48 PEW HISPANIC CENTER, WHEN LABELS DON’T FIT: HISPANICS AND THEIR 
VIEWS OF IDENTITY 4 (2012) available at  
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/04/PHC-Hispanic-Identity.pdf. 
49 Id. 
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forms of language discrimination.50 Another section of the Act, Title II,51 
which addresses discrimination in places of public accommodation, has not 
been used to tackle language discrimination, but it could be.52 The Act was 
primarily concerned with addressing racial restrictions in employment, 
education, places of public accommodation, and full participation in 
democracy; thus, in evaluating the Act’s efficacy in combating language 
discrimination, it is appropriate to focus on these areas.53 In recent years, 
there appears to have been an upsurge in language discrimination in 
workplaces, public schools, and restaurants.54 This section discusses the 
current state of language discrimination jurisprudence under the Act and how 
the Act can be better utilized to promote language equality.  
 
A.  Language Discrimination in Employment 
 
The majority of language discrimination litigation has arisen in the 
employment context. Language discrimination in the workplace can occur in 
a variety of ways, such as denying employment or promotion based upon 
English-language ability, non-English usage, or accent.55 Policies that are 
frequently challenged are English-only workplace rules.56 These rules 
prohibit workers from speaking languages other than English on the job and 
have become increasingly common in the past few decades.57 Challenges to 
employee-firings as a result of a violation of English-only workplace rules 
are most often evaluated under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.58 
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, 
sex, and national origin.59 Prohibiting employees from speaking non-English 
languages at work has been found to constitute national origin discrimination 
                                                 
50 See James Leonard, Bilingualism and Equality: Title VII Claims for Language 
Discrimination in the Workplace, 38 MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 70 (2004); see 
generally Rodríguez, supra note 9.  
51 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012). 
52 Id. 
53 Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352 (1964). 
54 See, e.g., Beard, supra note 24, at 1501, 1503–05; Michael DiChiara, Note, A 
Modern Day Myth: The Necessity of English as the Official Language, 17 B.C. 
THIRD WORLD L.J. 101, 129–30 (1997). 
55 Beard, supra note 24, at 1496, 1503–05. 
56 Mirandé, supra note 24, at 76. 
57 Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, 100 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1689, 1689 (2006). 
58 Deborah F. Buckman, Requirement That Employees Speak English in Workplace 
as Violative of Federal Constitutional and Statutory Law, 24 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 587. 
59 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).  
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in violation of Title VII.60 
The term “national origin” is not defined in the Act.61 However, 
national origin has been defined by the United States Supreme Court as 
“refer[ing] to the country where a person was born or, more broadly, the 
country from which his or her ancestors came.”62 For Title VII purposes, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has delineated 
national origin discrimination as including “the denial of equal employment 
opportunity because of an individual’s, or his or her ancestor’s place of 
origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic 
characteristics of a national origin group.”63 The EEOC has also declared that 
an “essential national origin characteristic” is the “primary language of an 
individual.”64 These guidelines are forward-thinking and recognize the reality 
that one’s native language is a part of his or her national origin and that 
discrimination on the basis of language or background can amount to national 
origin discrimination under the Act.  
 The EEOC presumes that rules requiring employees to speak English 
at all times in the workplace, including breaks, violate Title VII because such 
rules amount to burdensome terms and conditions of employment and can 
foster a hostile work environment.65  
 
The primary language of an individual is often an essential 
national origin characteristic. Prohibiting employees at all 
times, in the workplace, from speaking their primary language 
or the language they speak most comfortably, disadvantages 
an individual’s employment opportunities on the basis of 
national origin. It may also create an atmosphere of inferiority, 
isolation[,] and intimidation based on national origin which 
could result in a discriminatory working environment.66 
 
When English-only rules are only applied at certain times, the rules 
                                                 
60 See, e.g., EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (N.D. 
Tex. 2000); Saucedo v. Bros. Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979). 
However, while it is well-settled that English-only workplace rules may potentially 
violate Title VII, in the majority of Title VII cases challenging such rules the 
courts have found that the rules were justified by business necessity and do not 
violate Title VII. See Buckman, supra note 58.  
61 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (noting the lack of a definition for “natural origin”). 
62 Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973).  
63 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1980). 
64 Id. § 1606.7. 
65 Id. § 1606.7(a). 
66 Id. 
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must be justified by business necessity.67 Recognized business necessities 
include safety, where all communications in a common language of English 
enable employees to understand the dangerous task at hand,68 and serving 
monolingual English-speaking customers.69 The EEOC acknowledges that 
“[i]t is common for individuals whose primary language is not English to 
inadvertently change from speaking English to speaking their primary 
language.”70 As such, employers who believe they have a business necessity 
justifying an English-only rule must provide notice to the employees 
outlining the “general circumstances when speaking only in English is 
required and of the consequences of violating the rule.”71 Failure to provide 
such notice is considered evidence of discrimination on the basis of national 
origin.72 However, it should be noted that the courts have not uniformly 
followed the EEOC guidelines.73 
A distinction has been made in the courts between employees who are 
fully bilingual and those who are LEP. The courts’ treatment of bilingual 
employees is troubling. Many courts have found that employees who are fully 
bilingual in English and another language should be able to comply with the 
employer’s language policy and thus are less able to attack it because they 
can choose to speak only English.74 This emphasis on language “choice” is 
problematic for at least two key reasons. First, bilingual people often 
involuntarily speak their native language, so it is not always an actual choice. 
Second, emphasis on the bilingual employee’s choice of language obfuscates 
the employer’s discrimination.  
As noted above in the EEOC regulations, bilingual people often 
inadvertently speak in their native language. “[A]dhering to an English-only 
requirement is not simply a matter of preference for Hispanics, or other 
persons who are bilingual speakers, but . . . such restraints can be virtually 
impossible in many cases[,]” particularly when speaking with members of 
                                                 
67 Id. § 1606.7(b). 
68 Montes v. Vail Clinic, Inc., 497 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2007).  
69 Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980). 
70 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(c) (1980). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 See. e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the 
notion that an across-the-board English-only workplace rule presumptively 
establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact based on national origin 
discrimination). 
74 Gonzalez v. Salvation Army, 985 F.2d 578 (11th Cir. 1993); Jurado v. Eleven-
Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987); Gloor, 618 F.2d 264. 
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their own cultural group.75 Many Title VII language discrimination cases 
arise after Latino employees were fired for briefly speaking to a fellow Latino 
Spanish-speaking coworker.76 For instance, in the case of Garcia v. Gloor, 
Gloor Lumber Supply had an English-only rule prohibiting employees from 
speaking Spanish at work unless they were communicating with Spanish-
speaking customers or on break.77 Gloor Lumber Supply is located in 
Brownsville, Texas, and a majority of both their employees and customers 
are Spanish-speaking Latinos. Hector Garcia, a bilingual Mexican American 
salesperson, was fired when another Mexican American employee asked him 
a question concerning a product requested by a customer and Garcia 
responded in Spanish that the item was not available.78  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that this 
enforcement of the employer’s “speak-only-English” rule did not amount to 
national origin discrimination or otherwise violate Title VII because Mr. 
Garcia was bilingual and thus chose to speak Spanish on that occasion.79 Like 
many bilingual employees, Mr. Garcia did not actively choose to violate a 
workplace rule. His Spanish response to a fellow Latino coworker’s question 
was not an act of insubordination or even conscious choice at that moment; 
it was simply an involuntary slip of the tongue. The fact that bilingual 
speakers often inadvertently revert back to their native language when 
speaking with persons from their cultural group demonstrates how English-
language requirements can be an unfair burden in employment, and also how 
deeply-rooted native language is in a person’s communication and identity.  
Focusing on bilingual speakers’ “choice” of language obscures the 
racism and xenophobia behind English-only rules. In the Gloor case, Mr. 
Garcia’s Spanish reply to a Latino coworker did not harm the employer’s 
business in any way. However, the employer’s English-only policy and 
termination for violation of this policy was a significant harm to Mr. Garcia. 
As the EEOC has explained, one’s native language is core to one’s national 
origin.80 Penalizing an employee for—or preventing an employee from—
expressing this essential element of his or her national origin when there is 
                                                 
75 EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (N.D. Tex 
2000) (discussing the testimony of expert witness, Dr. Susan Berk-Selingson). 
76 See, e.g., Saucedo v. Bros. Well Servs., Inc. 464 F. Supp. 919, 922 (S.D. Tex. 
1979) (Mexican American discharged for saying two words in Spanish about 
where to place an item to his coworker); Gloor, 618 F.2d at 266 (Mexican 
American discharged for responding to a coworker’s question in Spanish about 
whether an item requested by a customer was available).  
77 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980). 
78 Id. at 266. 
79 Id. at 271. 
80 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1980). 
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no genuine business necessity is inherently discriminatory. It is a direct attack 
on the employee’s national origin as well as race.  
The discriminatory nature of English-only rules is striking when 
compared with discrimination on the basis of religion, which is also a 
protected characteristic under Title VII. Absent undue hardship on the 
employer, it would be unlawful for an employer to discharge a Sikh man who 
refused to remove his turban or a Catholic woman who refused to remove her 
crucifix necklace at work.81 Technically, a Sikh could choose to remove his 
turban and a Catholic could choose to remove her crucifix. However, the law 
recognizes that conditioning employment and its terms and conditions on 
such activity is discriminatory in itself.82 Although the employee theoretically 
could choose to forgo key aspects of expressing his or her religion, the 
employer’s unnecessary requests would result in dignitary harm, and 
acquiescence would carry a heavy cost for the employee. Arbitrary English-
language requirements are similar. Even if bilingual employees could abstain 
from speaking their native language, requiring them to do so absent business 
necessity amounts to a tremendous dignitary harm, as well as an attack on 
their national origin and possibly their racial background. However, the 
courts have too often treated English-language requirements as akin to 
general grooming and dress-code requirements without recognizing the 
connection between native language and national origin, ethnicity, and race.83 
Prohibiting a bilingual employee from speaking her native language 
is demanding her to give up a key attribute of her protected national origin, 
and often racial, identity.84 Firing an employee for speaking his native or 
cultural language, absent actual business necessity, is discrimination against 
that employee’s national origin (and frequently race) even if the employee 
                                                 
81 See EEOC, Religious Garb and Grooming in the Workplace: Rights and 
Responsibilities, EEOC.GOV, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/qa_religious_garb_grooming.cfm (last 
visited June 9, 2015); but see Dawinder S. Sidhu, Out of Sight, Out of Legal 
Recourse: Interpreting and Revising Title VII to Prohibit Workplace Segregation 
Based on Religion, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 103 (2012) (discussing 
how discriminatory employers have devised ways to get around Title VII’s 
provisions). 
82 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
83 Mirandé, supra note 24, at 76; Roman Amaguin, Garcia v. Spun Steak 
Company: Has the Judicial Door Been Shut on English-Only Plaintiffs?, 16 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 351, 363 n.104 (1994) (noting how the Garcia court compared the 
employer’s “English-only policy to grooming codes or length of hair”). 
84 See Ruiz Cameron, supra note 27, at 1366 (“To suppress the speaking of 
Spanish is to suppress an essential, if not the essential, component of Latino 
identity.”). 
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technically could choose to speak English. Like religion, language is, at least 
to some extent, a mutable characteristic. However, the fact that a protected 
trait can be changed should not determine whether legal protection is 
warranted. Rather, legal scrutiny should focus on the necessity of the 
employer’s requirement that an employee change a protected characteristic, 
not on whether the protected characteristic could be changed. 
Scholars have frequently written about English-only workplace rules 
and their impact on employees. An important yet largely overlooked point is 
the impact of English-only workplace policies on consumers. In addition to 
employees’ interests, the effect of workplace rules on customers and the 
broader public should be considered. English-only workplace rules vary.85 
Some allow (and even encourage) Spanish-speaking employees to serve 
customers in Spanish,86 while others prohibit bilingual employees from 
speaking Spanish to consumers even if it is the customers’ primary or 
preferred language.87 In fact, customer service jobs are the types of jobs most 
likely to have English-only workplace policies.88 Thus, many consumers are 
affected by English-only rules.  
The impact of English-only workplace rules on consumers is 
important for many reasons. First, English-only workplace rules can restrict 
the availability of goods and services to minorities. Second, examining the 
effect of such rules on customers reveals the discriminatory animus behind 
such rules. English-only rules are frequently instituted in restaurants and 
hotels.89 When English-only rules are introduced and enforced in these and 
other places of public accommodation, Title II may also be implicated. 
Accordingly, in evaluating the impact of English-only workplace policies on 
consumers, it is appropriate to examine Title II’s potential to protect 
consumers who are subject to language discrimination. Like English-only 
requirements in schools (discussed below), English-only demands in 
                                                 
85 See Kelley Holland, When English Is the Rule at Work, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/jobs/27mgmt.html?_r=0. 
86 See, e.g., Long v. First Union Corp. of Va., 894 F. Supp. 933, 933 (E.D. Va. 
1995) (upholding a policy that forbade employees from speaking Spanish except 
where a Spanish speaking customer required assistance); Garcia, 618 F.2d at 266. 
87 See, e.g., Holland, supra note 85. 
88 Rodríguez, supra note 57, at 1690. 
89 See, e.g., id. at 1736–37 (discussing the EEOC settlement with Melrose Hotel); 
Complaint, EEOC v. Melrose Hotel Co., No. 04 CV 7514 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 
2004); EEOC v. Melrose Hotel Co., No. 04 CV 7514 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 23, 2004) 
(consent decree prohibiting the defendant from enforcing its English-only policy); 
EEOC v. Brown Derby Rest., No. 92-2940, at 3–4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1992) 
(consent decree prohibiting the defendant from enforcing its English-only policy). 
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restaurants have seen a revival in recent decades.90  
 
B.  Language Discrimination in Public Accommodations 
 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, “All persons shall 
be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or 
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.”91 
Establishments that qualify as places of public accommodation within the 
meaning of Title II include hotels, restaurants, lunch counters, gas stations, 
and places of public entertainment such as theatres, concert halls, and sports 
stadiums.92 
Title II was prompted by the refusal of private business owners to 
serve African Americans in the South and the protests against this 
discrimination. Pushing for equal access to public accommodations and 
responding to demonstrations at lunch counters in the South, President John 
F. Kennedy gave a speech to Congress in support of the Civil Rights Act, 
stating, “Surely, in 1963, [one hundred] years after Emancipation, it should 
not be necessary for any American citizen to demonstrate in the streets for 
the opportunity to stop at a hotel, or to eat at a lunch counter in the very 
department store in which he is shopping, or to enter a motion picture house, 
on the same terms as any other customer.”93 The legislative history of Title 
II reveals that the fundamental object of Title II was to vindicate “the 
deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal 
access to public establishments.”94  
                                                 
90 See Steven W. Bender, Silencing Cultures and Culturing Silence: A 
Comparative Experience of Centrifugal Forces in the Ethnic Studies Curriculum, 
33 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 329, 330 n.25 (2000) (citing Steven W. Bender, Direct 
Democracy and Distrust: The Relationship between Language Law Rhetoric and 
the Language Vigilantism Experience, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 145, 170–72 
(1997) (discussing civil rights litigation seeking redress from enforcement of 
English-only policies by restaurants and taverns against Spanish-speaking 
patrons)); DiChiara, supra note 54, at 130 (“[W]hen Florida’s English-only bill 
was enacted, shopkeepers and restaurant owners denied services to non-English-
speaking patrons simply because of their language.”) (citing Robert Robison, 
English-Only Policy Would Hinder, Not Help, Assimilation, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH, Nov. 16, 1995, at 15A)). 
91 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012). 
92 Id. § 2000a(b). 
93 S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 8–9 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2362. 
94 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964). 
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During the age of Jim Crow, in the Southwest, racial discrimination 
in and exclusion from places of public accommodation were common for 
Mexican Americans. Restaurant owners hung signs outside their 
establishments proclaiming “[N]o Mexicans or dogs allowed.”95 Mexican 
Americans were excluded from restaurants, could only sit in racially 
segregated balcony seats in movie theaters, and were only allowed to swim 
in public pools on “Mexican Day”—the day before the pool was drained and 
cleaned and made suitable for white patrons.96 In recent years, there seems to 
be a resurgence of excluding racial minorities, particularly Latinos, from 
places of public accommodation.97 However, in these colorblind times, signs 
proclaim “English only” instead of “No Mexicans.” The term “English only” 
has become racialized code. Despite the different wording, the result and 
underlying aim is basically the same: Latinos are refused entry on the basis 
of their race and national origin or, at a minimum, are made to feel 
unwelcome. Even if Latino patrons can speak English and will be served, 
they are being asked to abandon or distance themselves from a core attribute 
of their cultural, national origin, and racial groups. Even when this does not 
amount to an actual inconvenience, it can still be an indignity.  
Examining English-only requirements in places of public 
accommodation demonstrates how such rules are not race-neutral. English-
only rules do not merely have a disparate impact on Latinos and other racial 
and national origin minorities; rather, there is also often discriminatory intent 
behind these rules. Modern racism has abandoned the racial epithets of old 
and now uses racial and racist code words.98 One example is the English-only 
ordering policy at Philadelphia’s famous cheesesteak restaurant, Geno’s 
Steaks. In 2006, the owner placed a sign stating, “This is America: When 
Ordering Speak English.”99 The owner of the establishment stated that he 
                                                 
95 Castañeda, supra note 13, at 234. 
96 STEVEN W. BENDER, GREASERS AND GRINGOS: LATINOS, LAW, AND THE 
AMERICAN IMAGINATION 144–45 (2003); Ariela J. Gross, “The Caucasian 
Cloak”: Mexican Americans and the Politics of Whiteness in the Twentieth-
Century Southwest, 95 GEO. L.J. 337, 382 (2007). 
97 Keith Aoki et al., (In)visible Cities: Three Local Government Models and 
Immigration Regulation, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L. 453, 521 (2008) (“Recently, 
activists sought prohibitions on the use of non-English languages for restaurant 
patrons and urged private employers to impose English-only rules on their 
employees.”). 
98 See generally IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED 
RACIAL APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM & WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 
(2014). 
99 Michelle García, Wit Cheese, Not Con Queso, WASH. POST, June 18, 2006, at 
A2. 
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posted the sign in response to the debate on immigration reform and the 
number of people in the area who are unable to order in English.100 This 
statement is revealing because, when he made it, the historically Italian 
community where this restaurant is located had seen an increase of 
immigrants from Latin America.101 Additionally, “immigration” and 
“immigrant” are racially coded words synonymous with Latinos.102 The 
owner also placed a sign stating, “I am Mad as Hell! I want My Country 
Back!”103 The idea that white Americans want “their country back” is 
commonly a response to the presence of Latinos, both native born and 
immigrant.104 
However, current colorblind formalistic jurisprudence ignores these 
indicators of racial animus. Despite the racist and xenophobic motivation 
behind Geno’s Steaks’ English-only sign, the Philadelphia Commission on 
Human Relations found the sign was not discriminatory because it “did not 
convey a message that service would be refused to non-English speakers.”105 
In response, the restaurant owner thanked the Commissioner for “making him 
a hero.”106 Although the owner has since died, the sign remains posted to 
honor his “dying wish” that it be preserved.107  
Similarly, in 2011, the Reedy Creek Family Diner in Greensboro, 
                                                 
100 Philadelphia’s Geno’s Steaks Adopts English-Only Ordering Policy, FOX NEWS 




102 Leila Higgins, Immigration and the Vulnerable Worker: We Built this Country 
on Cheap Labor, 3 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 522, 526 (2013); Mary Romero, Are 
Your Papers in Order?: Racial Profiling, Vigilantes, and “America’s Toughest 
Sheriff,” 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 337, 350 (2011); see generally LÓPEZ, supra 
note 98.  
103 Geno’s Joey Vento Dead at 71, PHILLYMAG.COM (Aug. 24, 2011, 1:18 A.M.) 
http://www.phillymag.com/foobooz/2011/08/24/genos-joey-vento-dead-at-71/. 
104 DeWayne Wickham, In Ethnic Pandering, Obama Can’t Top Reagan, USA 
TODAY, June 19, 2012, at 7A. 
105Andrew Maykuth, Ruling: “Speak English” Sign at Cheesesteak Shop Not 
Discriminatory, PHILLY.COM (Mar. 20, 2008), http://articles.philly.com/2008-03-
20/news/24989499_1_english-sign-geno-s-steaks-philadelphia-commission. 
106 Id.  
107 Victor Fiorillo, Joey Vento’s Dying Wish: Keep “Speak English” Sign at 
Geno’s, PHILLYMAG.COM (Aug. 30, 2013, 12:07 PM), http://www.phillymag.com/ 
foobooz/2013/08/30/joey-ventos-dying-wish-keep-the-speak-english-sign-at-
genos/. 
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North Carolina displayed a sign stating: “No Speak English. No Service.”108 
Another line of the sign read, “We only speak and understand American.”109 
The owner says he placed the sign in response to “several Latino customers 
that came in and weren’t able to speak or read English.”110 He reported it was 
frustrating for him and the customers, and although he did not know enough 
Spanish to assist them with their order, he did know enough to understand he 
was being cursed at and put down.111 After placing the sign outside his 
business, he reported that he received an outpouring of positive feedback.112 
He stated that he received supportive telephone calls from people in every 
state and eight foreign countries, was interviewed by politically conservative 
talk show hosts Rush Limbaugh and Glenn Beck, and, perhaps most 
importantly, tripled his business.113 The signs were so popular that he claims 
he printed 1,700 copies and gave away all but one.114  
Pro English, a group who advocates for “Official English” and 
English-only reform, contacted the owner of Reedy Creek Family Diner 
offering to represent him in any legal proceedings that might result from the 
English-only policy.115 Although legal action challenging such language 
requirements has not been brought, Title II could be an effective tool to 
address this type of language discrimination. Title II allows private actions 
for injunctive relief,116 and prevailing parties are generally entitled attorney 
fees.117  
 
1. The Negative Impact of English-Only Rules on Consumers  
 
 Whether the English-only requirements directly target patrons or 
indirectly affect customers when employees are prohibited from speaking 
                                                 
108 David Bodenheimer, ‘English Only’ Sign Back Up to Stay at Diner, Owner 
Says, THE DISPATCH, http://www.the-dispatch.com/article/20110519/NEWS/30 
5199978 (last modified, May 19, 2011, 2:30 P.M.); see also Fox News Insider, 
“English Only” Sign Triples Diner’s Business, YOUTUBE (May 23, 2011) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OPB-7XesVrg. 
109 Bodenheimer, supra note 108, at 1. 






116 Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 204(a), 206, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(a), 2000a-5 
(2012). 
117 Reasonable attorney’s fees are available to prevailing Title II plaintiffs under § 
204(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, within the discretion of the court. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (2012). 
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non-English languages to customers, they negatively impact consumers and 
reveal the discriminatory animus behind such requirements. English-only 
requirements serve to exclude national origin and racial minorities, especially 
Latinos. This discriminatory exclusion produces both tangible and intangible 
injuries. Tangibly, these minorities are deprived of goods and services 
available to others. They also suffer intangible injuries, such as the dignitary 
harm that results when a business chooses to prohibit—or at least strongly 
discourage—people from their cultural, national origin, and racial group from 
being served by the establishment. These types of deprivations are matters 
about which the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is centrally concerned.  
The effects of English-only workplace rules—restricting the 
availability of goods and services and denying dignity to employees and 
customers who speak other languages—reveal the discriminatory animus 
underlying them. English-only rules “appear most often in the consumer 
services sector[.]”118 Most EEOC complaints deal with the prohibition of 
Spanish language, and many of the workplaces at issue in these cases are 
located in areas with a significant Spanish-speaking Latino community.119 
Rules prohibiting employees from speaking Spanish in consumer services 
result in decreased services for Spanish-speaking Latino customers.120 
Although Latino employees are directly constrained by English-only rules, in 
many circumstances it may be the customers who are also indirectly targeted. 
As mentioned above, in some instances, Latino employees are prohibited 
from speaking Spanish with Spanish-speaking customers, even when those 
customers are monolingual.121 Moreover, as discussed above, some 
businesses may limit their customer pool even further by requiring that 
customers speak only English in order to receive service.  
There seem to be two primary reasons a business would choose to 
limit its customer pool by excluding national origin and racial minorities, and 
both indicate discriminatory impetus. The business either wants to profit from 
discrimination by appealing to intolerant customers, or it prefers 
discrimination over making a profit. The first is a reason business owners 
frequently expressed after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
when establishments that excluded African Americans claimed that serving 
black people was economically detrimental to their businesses.122 This “while 
                                                 
118 Rodríguez, supra note 57, at 1690. 
119 Id. at 1700. 
120 See DiChiara, supra note 54, at 125 (explaining how “English-only” rules lead 
to miscommunication by preventing non-native English speakers from 
communicating with the United States government). 
121 See, e.g., Holland, supra note 85.  
122 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (rejecting a restaurant’s 
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I don’t mind black people, my customers do” attitude is itself discriminatory 
because the business owner is supporting and propagating societal prejudice. 
Conformity to discriminatory customer preference is not a legally permissible 
basis upon which to discriminate against employees or customers.123 
If excluding minorities is not lucrative, then discriminatory intent may 
be indicated by the business’s failure to act rationally. Ambitious businesses 
would likely seek Spanish-speaking employees to cater to a Spanish-speaking 
clientele to be locally competitive, or utilize bilingual signs, or at a minimum 
simply refrain from taking steps to actively discourage speakers of languages 
other than English from spending money at their establishment. A rational 
business person would be eager to have employees who speak Spanish or try 
to otherwise accommodate LEP customers to maximize profits, especially if 
it came at no additional investment. Conversely, discriminatory businesses 
intentionally seek to limit their service to this group of customers. 
Discriminatory intent should be inferred from the failure to act like a rational 
economic actor.  
 
C.  Title VI: Public Programs Receiving Federal Funding  
 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its corresponding 
regulations provide protection against language discrimination and require in 
many instances that LEP individuals be provided language interpretation in 
order to meaningfully participate in public programs and activities. Title VI 
provides that, “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.”124 Despite the lack of specific textual 
reference or mention of language in its legislative history, similar to the 
interpretation of Title VII, language discrimination has been recognized as a 
form of national origin and race discrimination under Title VI.125 The most 
                                                 
argument that it would lose a substantial amount of business if it were required to 
serve African Americans); Williams v. Connell, 9 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1427 (D.C. 
Fla. 1964) (arguing that African Americans could not be served in the restaurant 
because that would be detrimental to its business). 
123 See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276–77 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(holding that an employer cannot refuse to hire women solely on customer 
preference to conduct business with men); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 
442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971); Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 
(N.D. Tex. 1981). 
124 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).  
125 Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
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famous instance is the United States Supreme Court case Lau v. Nichols.126 
In Lau, LEP children of Chinese ancestry claimed that San Francisco public 
schools failed to provide them with English as a Second Language (ESL) 
instruction in violation of Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.127 The Court found that the failure to provide ESL 
instruction to these students prevented their access to a meaningful 
education.128 The Court concluded that the Chinese-speaking LEP students 
had been denied a federally funded educational benefit on the basis of their 
national origin or race in violation of Title VI.129 Having decided the case on 
statutory grounds, the Court declined to reach the Equal Protection claim.130  
On August 11, 2000, President William J. Clinton issued Executive 
Order 13166, “Improving Access to Services for Persons with Limited 
English Proficiency.”131 Executive Order 13166 requires federal agencies to 
examine the services they provide, identify the need for these services to LEP 
persons, and develop an approach so that LEP persons have meaningful 
access to these services.132 The Order also requires that federal agencies make 
efforts to ensure that recipients of federal financial assistance also provide 
meaningful access to their services.133 Specifically, federal agencies are 
required to: (1) develop a plan that provides LEP individuals meaningful 
access to the agency’s programs and/or services; (2) issue agency-specific 
guidance to bring the agency’s programs/recipients of federal funds into 
compliance with Title VI, if the agency has not already done so; and (3) 
ensure that LEP individuals have input throughout the process.134 Both Title 
VI protection against language discrimination and the requirement that 
language interpretation be provided to LEP individuals have been applied to 
ensure access to the courts. 
 
1. Language Discrimination in the Courts: Access & Jury Service 
 
In response to Executive Order 13166, the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) issued its own LEP Guidance regulations.135 The DOJ’s LEP 
                                                 
126 See id. 
127 See id. at 564. 
128 Id. at 566. 
129 Id. at 566–69. 
130 Id. at 566. 




135 67 Fed. Reg. 41455, 41459 (June 18, 2002). 
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regulations were designed to direct funding recipients “to ensure that the 
programs and activities they normally provide in English are accessible to 
LEP persons and thus do not discriminate on the basis of national origin in 
violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”136 Executive Order 
13166 and the DOJ’s LEP Guidance have been applied in the court context 
and confirm that most courts are required to provide language services to LEP 
persons who participate in the courts.137 
Relying in part on Lau v. Nichols,138 the DOJ’s LEP Guidance  
reiterates that “failure to ensure that LEP persons can effectively participate 
in or benefit from Federally assisted programs and activities may violate the 
[national origin] prohibition under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 . . . and the Title VI regulations against national origin 
discrimination.”139 Recipients of federal funding must consider four factors 
when determining what language assistance is necessary to provide 
meaningful access to its programs:  
(1) The number or proportion of LEP persons eligible to be 
served or likely to be encountered by the program or grantee; 
(2) the frequency with which LEP individuals come in contact 
with the program; (3) the nature and importance of the 
program, activity, or service provided by the program to 
people’s lives; and (4) the resources available to the 
grantee/recipient and costs.140 
After weighing these factors, recipients of federal funding must 
determine the extent of language assistance they should provide. However, 
the LEP Guidance specifies that this flexibility “does not diminish, and 
should not be used to minimize” the agency’s obligations under Title VI.141 
Thus, if certain programs are “more important . . . and/or have greater impact 
on or contact with LEP persons,” more language assistance will be 
                                                 
136 Exec. Order No. 13166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50121 (Aug. 11, 2000). 
137 67 Fed. Reg. 41455, 41459 (specifying that courts are covered entities); LAURA 
K. ABEL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, LANGUAGE ACCESS IN STATE COURTS 
(2009) [hereinafter BRENNAN CTR. REPORT], available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org /publication/language-access-state-courts. 
138 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
139 Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title VI 
Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English 
Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. Reg. 41455, 41457 (June 18, 2002). 
140 Id. at 41459. 
141 Id. 
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 Applied to the courts, this four-factor test requires, among other 
things, that recipient courts ensure that LEP litigants and witnesses receive 
language assistance.143  
At a minimum, every effort should be taken to ensure 
competent interpretation for LEP individuals during all 
hearings, trials, and motions during which the LEP individual 
must and/or may be present. When a recipient court appoints 
an attorney to represent an LEP defendant, the court should 
ensure that either the attorney is proficient in the LEP person's 
language or that a competent interpreter is provided during 
consultations between the attorney and the LEP person.144 
The DOJ LEP regulations mention how some courts have adopted 
certification procedures for court interpreters and instruct courts to consider 
carefully the qualifications of court interpreters who are not certified.145 
These regulations also specify that informal interpreters, such as family 
members, are inappropriate.146  
The issue of providing language accommodation to enhance court 
participation among LEP beneficiaries and participants has focused primarily 
on litigants.147 But the exclusion of LEP citizens from jury service, and the 
attendant denial of juror language accommodation (interpretation for jurors), 
is also an underexplored language-rights issue with significant racial and 
national origin implications. Elsewhere, I have argued that English-language 
juror requirements and the failure to provide juror language accommodation 
violates the Fair Cross-Section requirement of the Sixth Amendment and 
raises serious Equal Protection concerns.148 Here, I explore how the failure to 
allow LEP jurors to serve with juror language accommodation may violate 
Title VI. 
Many people simply assume that LEP individuals are not competent 
to serve on a jury because of their lack of English-language skills. However, 
                                                 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 41471. 
144 Id.  
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Gonzales Rose, supra note 29, at 862. 
148 Id. at 831, 848; Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, The Exclusion of Non-English-
Speaking Jurors: Remedying a Century of Denial of the Sixth Amendment in the 
Federal Courts of Puerto Rico, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 497 (2011).  
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this ignores the possibility of allowing a juror to serve with the assistance of 
language interpreters. Juror language accommodation is not a new idea. It has 
an extensive, centuries-old history in the United States and Anglo-American 
legal systems.149 Further, juror language accommodation has long been 
employed in the state courts of New Mexico150 and is currently provided in 
most courts for hard of hearing, deaf, and blind jurors.151  
All federal courts152 and most state courts153 require English-language 
proficiency as a prerequisite to serve on juries. Although the focus of Title 
VI analysis has been on litigants, jurors are also participants within the 
meaning of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As such, the exclusion 
of LEP jurors on the basis of their English-language ability could run afoul 
of Title VI. If otherwise eligible, LEP citizens could be made competent to 
serve on juries with language accommodation. Thus, in communities with 
significant numbers of LEP citizens, denying LEP citizens juror language 
accommodation could amount to unlawful discrimination on the basis of 
national origin or race under Title VI. 
While no notable Title VI litigation has occurred on the issue, it seems 
clear that jurors should be considered participants in court programs pursuant 
to Title VI. Under similarly worded statutes like the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 (RHA) and Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), jurors have 
                                                 
149 Hiroshi Fukari & Darryl Davies, Affirmative Action in Jury Selection: Racially 
Representative Juries, Racial Quotas, and Affirmative Juries of the Hennepin 
Model and the Jury De Medietate Linguae, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 645, 654–56 
(1997) (“At various times between 1674 and 1911, a number of states—including 
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, Virginia, and 
South Carolina—each provided for juries de medietate linguae.”); see Deborah A. 
Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury De Medietate 
Linguae: A History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. REV. 777, 790 (1994). 
150 N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (providing, “The right of any citizen of the state to 
vote, hold office or sit upon juries, shall never be restricted, abridged or impaired 
on account of religion, race, language or color, or inability to speak, read or write 
the English or Spanish languages . . . .”); State v. Samora, 307 P.3d 328, 330–31 
(N.M. 2013) (holding that the district court’s excusal of a LEP Spanish-speaking 
prospective juror violated the juror’s state constitutional rights to serve on a jury). 
151 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012). 
152 Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861, 1865(b)(2) (2012) 
(providing that a person is not qualified for jury service if she does not speak 
English or “is unable to read, write, and understand the English language with a 
degree of proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror qualification 
form”). 
153 See Gonzales Rose, supra note 29, 817–822 (providing an overview of state 
court English-language juror requirements.).  
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been deemed “participants” in court proceedings.154 When initially looking 
to draft a piece of civil rights legislation for persons with disabilities, 
Congress turned to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act to craft § 504 of the RHA, 
the precursor to the ADA.155 While Title VI provides that no person shall on 
the basis “of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,”156 the RHA with 
the same wording provides that no qualified individual with a disability shall 
“be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected 
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”157  
In cases interpreting this RHA provision, once it is decided that jury 
service is a federally funded program, it is then accepted that persons with 
disabilities serving as jurors must not be denied that participation. For 
example, in Galloway v. Superior Court, the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia interpreted the RHA’s language to conclude that it 
was “readily apparent” that the jury system fell within the purview of the 
statute such that Mr. Galloway, a blind man who previously had been 
dismissed categorically due to his blindness, must be allowed participation 
so long as he was “otherwise qualified.”158 Similarly, although not as 
explicitly, in People v. Caldwell, the Criminal Court in the City of New York 
concluded that because summarily dismissing persons with disabilities from 
the jury selection process violated the ADA, jury service must be a “program” 
contemplated under the statute in which persons with disabilities were 
entitled to participate.159 This presupposes that jurors are participants in the 
court program. 
When a program participant is excluded from a federally funded 
program on the basis of being LEP, the DOJ has set forth four factors that 
should be considered to determine whether language assistance is required. 
The first two factors are the “number or proportion of LEP persons eligible 
to be served or likely to be encountered by the program or grantee” and “the 
frequency with which LEP individuals come in contact with the 
                                                 
154 Galloway v. Superior Court, 816 F. Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1993). 
155 RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2005). 
156 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (emphasis added). 
157 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012) (emphasis added).  
158 Galloway, 816 F. Supp. at 15.  
159 603 N.Y.S. 2d 713, 715 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.1993), aff’d, 661 N.Y.S. 2d 436 (N.Y. 
App. Term 1997). 
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program[.]”160 In many areas of the country, there are significant numbers of 
LEP persons, especially Spanish-speaking Latinos. Nationally, English-
language requirements result in the juror disenfranchisement of almost 13 
million United States citizens.161 Some communities, particularly those in 
urban areas or located near the southern border, have notably high 
populations of LEP residents.162 These populations tend to be geographically 
concentrated. Half of LEP persons reside in three states: New York, Texas, 
and California.163 In California and Texas there are several cities where LEP 
persons comprise over a quarter of the population. For instance, in Texas, 56 
percent of Laredo’s residents are LEP, in El Paso it is 33 percent, and in 
McAllen it is 32 percent.164 In California, 31 percent of the residents of 
Salinas are LEP, 29 percent in El Centro, and 25 percent in greater Los 
Angeles.165 There are many other jurisdictions throughout the United States, 
including Puerto Rico, where LEP citizens make up a significant portion of 
the community.166 As different regions have varying concentrations of LEP 
persons, the need for juror language accommodation must be evaluated 
specifically in each court’s jurisdiction. Since the majority of LEP persons 
are Spanish-speaking,167 Spanish-language interpretation services are 
particularly needed.  
The third factor presented by the DOJ to determine whether language 
interpretation should be provided is “the nature and importance of the 
program, activity, or service provided by the program” to people’s lives.168 
Serving on a jury is an important responsibility of citizenship. When a person 
is excluded from this central function of democracy on the basis of their 
English-language ability, they are lumped together with the other groups of 
persons ineligible to serve: former felons, “infants,”169 non-citizens, and 
                                                 
160 67 Fed. Reg. 41455, 41459 (June 18, 2002). 
161 See Gonzales Rose, supra note 29, at 814 (showing that the number of LEP 
persons, irrespective of citizenship, is about twice as much).  
162 Jean Batalova & Monica Whatley, Limited English Proficient Population of the 





166 In Puerto Rico, approximately 90 percent of the age-eligible population is 
excluded from federal jury service due to the federal English-language juror 
requirement. Gonzales Rose, supra note 148, at 528–29. 
167 Jeanne Batalova et al., Limited English Proficient Individuals in the United 
States: Number, Share, Growth, and Linguistic Diversity, MIGRATION POLICY 
INSTITUTE, LEP DATA BRIEF, Dec. 2011, 6. 
168 67 Fed. Reg. 41455, 41459 (June 18, 2002). 
169 Defined here as persons who have not reached the age of majority. See 
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those deemed to have poor moral character.170 This results in tremendous 
dignitary harm as well as second-class status for LEP citizens.  
 English-language juror requirements also negatively impact criminal 
defendants. An estimated 11.3 million of the United States citizens precluded 
from jury service on the basis of English-language ability are people of 
color.171 In certain communities, English-language requirements can result in 
jury pools that are not racially representative of the community.172 Juries that 
are not representative of the community can have serious consequences for 
criminal defendants, who are often disproportionately people of color.173 
These criminal defendants may be denied a “jury of their peers” or their 
fundamental Sixth Amendment right to a jury selected from a “fair cross-
section of the community.”174 The purposes of having juries selected from a 
fair cross-section of the community are to:  
 
(1) “guard against the exercise of arbitrary power” ensuring 
that the “commonsense judgment of the community” will act 
as “a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor,” 
(2) preserving “public confidence in the fairness of the 
criminal justice system,” and (3) implementing our belief that 
“sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic 
responsibility.”175   
 
 Looking to this last purpose of having a representative jury pool, it is 
important to emphasize that when juries are not representative of the 
community, this can undercut the actual and perceived legitimacy and 
fairness of the courts and legal system.176 The majority of Americans believe 
that jury decisions reached by racially diverse juries are fairer than decisions 
                                                 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 793 (8th ed. 2004). 
170 See 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (2012). 
171 Gonzales Rose, supra note 29, at 814. 
172 Id. at 816. 
173 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 16 (2010). 
174 Gonzales Rose, supra note 29, at 848–56 (discussing how the exclusion of LEP 
jurors denies Latino criminal defendants the right to a “jury of their peers” or, 
more specifically, a jury selected from a “fair cross section of the community”). 
175 See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986) (quoting Taylor v. 
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530–31 (1970)). 
176 Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the 
Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 77 (1993). 
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reached by non-diverse juries.177 This belief is well-founded, as studies have 
revealed that racially homogenous white juries generally do not spend as 
much time deliberating, are less likely to consider diverse perspectives, and 
are more likely to commit errors or exhibit racism than racially diverse 
juries.178 By contrast, racially diverse juries lessen racist manifestations, 
consider more varied perspectives, deliberate more thoroughly, and 
ultimately commit fewer errors.179  
The fourth and final factor in determining whether language 
assistance is warranted is the resources available to the federal funding 
recipient (here the courts) and costs.180 The main resistance to providing 
interpretation to litigants and jurors are concerns about cost and accuracy.181 
These two concerns are closely related. Accuracy of interpretation can only 
be guaranteed if the interpreters are highly trained and certified. However, 
certified interpreters are in limited supply and require considerable financial 
investment.182 It is significant, however, that the limited supply of certified 
interpreters is itself a result of language discrimination. The majority of LEP 
persons are Spanish speakers.183 Thus, Spanish-language interpreters are in 
the greatest demand. If bilingual education was embraced rather than “No-
Spanish” and English-only policies in schools, there would be a larger pool 
of educated bilingual English-Spanish Americans, as well as speakers of 
other languages, who could train to become certified court interpreters. Any 
challenges to securing certified court interpreters should be scrutinized with 
the understanding that the shortage or cost obstacles (since presumably costs 
would be lower if there were a larger supply) have actually been brought 
about by discriminatory language policies. 
                                                 
177 HIROSHI FUKURAI & RICHARD KOOTH, RACE IN THE JURY BOX: AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION IN JURY SELECTION 128 (2003). 
178 See BRUCE EVAN BLAINE, UNDERSTANDING THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DIVERSITY 
101–04 (2d ed. 2013) (summarizing racial bias in jury deliberations and verdicts 
when juries are not sufficiently diverse); EDITH GREENE ET AL., WRIGHTSMAN’S 
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM, Jury Trials I: Jury Representativeness 
and Selection 305 (6th ed. 2007); Neil Vidmar, The North Carolina Racial Justice 
Act: An Essay on Substantive and Procedural Fairness in Death Penalty 
Litigation, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1969, 1980 (2012). 
179 See GREENE, supra note 178, at 305. 
180 67 Fed. Reg. 41455, 41459 (June 18, 2002). 
181 Gonzales Rose, supra note 29, at 859. 
182 Id. at 862. 
183 Jeanne Batalova et al., Limited English Proficient Individuals in the United 
States: Number, Share, Growth, and Linguistic Diversity, MIGRATION POLICY 
INSTITUTE, LEP DATA BRIEF, Dec. 2011, 6. 
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 Concerns about the accuracy and possible intrusive effect of juror 
language accommodation are valid but not insurmountable. There is a need 
to have qualified and certified interpreters such as the ones employed in the 
New Mexico state courts,184 and there is much that can be learned from the 
New Mexico interpretation system. Studies of LEP jurors in New Mexico 
state courts conducted by Lysette Chavez and Markus Kemmelmeir of the 
University of Nevada-Reno Department of Social Psychology have shown 
that not only is juror language accommodation possible, it is actually 
preferable.185 Archival research and mock jury studies demonstrate that LEP 
jurors and interpreters do not compromise deliberation outcomes.186 Further, 
additional studies have shown that jurors who served alongside LEP jurors 
receiving juror accommodation actually viewed future jury service more 
positively than those jurors who had not served with a LEP juror.187  
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was centrally concerned about race and 
national origin discrimination in key functions of democratic involvement.188 
The Act took a bold stance against discrimination that excluded people on the 
basis of their race and relegated them to second-class citizenship. Judicial and 
administrative agency interpretation of Title VI has taken a realist approach 
to recognizing that language discrimination can be a form of national origin 
or race discrimination. In the last quarter century, efforts have been made to 
increase interpretation services for LEP litigants in the courts, and it has been 
recognized that the failure to do so could amount to a Title VI violation.189 
However, Title VI has not been sufficiently utilized to challenge juror 
language exclusion. English-language juror requirements are generally 
viewed as race and national origin neutral. But these requirements are not 
race and national origin neutral because they do not take into account how 
juror language accommodation can make Latino and other minority LEP 
citizens eligible to serve.  
This is not the only manner in which these language requirements are 
viewed in isolation. Too often policy makers and jurists do not look at the 
systemic nature of juror language discrimination. Excluding citizens from 
jury service on the basis of LEP removes people of color from the jury pool 
                                                 
184 See generally Edward L. Chávez, New Mexico’s Success with Non-English 
Speaking Jurors, 1 J. CT. INNOVATION 303 (2008).  
185 Gonzales Rose, supra note 29, at 863.  
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188 ALEXANDER, supra note 173, at 38. 
189 See Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title VI 
Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English 
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and can result in unrepresentative juries. The perceived shortage of court 
interpreters is a result, at least in part, of English-only school policies and a 
lack of bilingual education. Further, the notion that a LEP person could fully 
participate on a jury if they learned English is a fallacy since bilingual jurors 
can be struck from jury service merely on the basis of their bilingual 
ability.190 
Too quickly the courts and society discount LEP citizens’ ability to 
serve with the assistance of interpreters. Centuries of historical practice of 
juror language accommodation as well as the experience of New Mexico state 
courts are ignored.191 Refusal to provide language accommodation to LEP 
jurors may violate Title VI in jurisdictions with significant numbers of LEP 
persons. Title VI should be employed to remedy this inequality and to reveal 
the discriminatory nature behind seemingly race-neutral English- language 
requirements.  
 
2. Language Discrimination in Education 
 
As the United States Supreme Court decision in Lau v. Nichols 
demonstrated, language discrimination in public schools can violate the 
national origin and race provisions of Title VI.192 Any school, public or 
private, that receives federal funds falls under the purview of Title VI.193 
There is a long history of language discrimination in schools in the United 
States.194 Some states banned the teaching of foreign languages, and teachers 
who taught in foreign languages faced possible prosecution.195 However, 
these linguistic hostilities against German and Japanese were short lived.196 
The targeting of both the Spanish language and Latino Spanish-speakers has 
persisted over the years and experienced a revival in the past several decades 
as hostility against Latino immigrants has heightened.197 
There is a long history of public schools in the Southwest imposing 
“No-Spanish” rules on Latino students.198 Such rules were particularly 
prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s, increasing when Mexican American 
                                                 
190 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) (plurality opinion). 
191 See generally Chávez, supra note 184. 
192 Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974). 
193 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012). 
194 VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 13, at 81–82. 
195 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Farrington v. Tokushige, 
273 U.S. 284 (1927). 
196 VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 13, at 82. 
197 Id. at 85–86. 
198 DENNIS BARON, THE ENGLISH-ONLY QUESTION: AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE FOR 
AMERICANS 166 (1990). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2627306
32                           LANGUAGE RIGHTS UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
  
 
children were allowed to integrate into previously racially segregated 
schools.199 Punishment for violating English-only school rules has varied in 
severity from humiliation, “Spanish detention,” or corporal punishment, to 
suspension or expulsion.200 Punishment for speaking Spanish was often 
designed to humiliate and imply that the Spanish language and those who 
speak it lack intelligence.201 Labor leader César Chávez long remembered 
and recounted instances where, in elementary school, he was placed with a 
dunce cap and a sign that said, “I am a clown, I speak Spanish.”202 Children 
were sometimes asked to write, “I will not speak Spanish on school grounds” 
hundreds of times on the blackboard,203 or were simply beaten for speaking 
a “dirty language.”204 The embarrassment of this punishment was 
undoubtedly amplified when a student had to explain to her parents that she 
had been disciplined for speaking their home language.205  
No-Spanish rules are highly damaging to Latino children and their 
ability to learn. In the late 1960s, the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights conducted the “Mexican American Education Study” to research the 
crisis of deficient Latino educational attainment.206 The Commission found 
that many school districts enforced No-Spanish rules and these policies were 
detrimental to the students’ personal and academic development.207 No-
Spanish rules inflict psychological harm and diminish Latino children’s self-
esteem, which in turn lessens learning outcomes.208 In response to No-
Spanish school rules, many Latino families felt pressured to make sure their 
                                                 
199 Buscando América, supra note 7, at 1443–45. 
200 Id. at 1443; Mirandé, supra note 24, at 102–3; BARON, supra note 198, at 166.  
201 See Buscando América, supra note 7, at 1444–45. 
202 RICHARD GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO & RICHARD A. GARCIA, CESAR CHAVEZ: 
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203 See Lupe Salinas, Arizona’s Desire to Eliminate Ethnic Studies Programs: A 
Time to Take the “Pill” and to Engage Latino Students in Critical Education 
About Their History, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 301, 315, n.105 (2011) (citing 
THOMAS P. CARTER, MEXICAN AMERICANS IN SCHOOL: A HISTORY OF 
EDUCATIONAL NEGLECT 97–98 (1970)) [hereinafter Arizona’s Desire to Eliminate 
Ethnic Studies Programs].  
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STUDENT 5 (1972)). 
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to OELALEAALEPS: How the No Child Left Behind Act Has Undermined English 
Language Learners’ Access to a Meaningful Education,14 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. 
& POL’Y 539, 549–50 (2007). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2627306




children only spoke English.209 This resulted in a loss of Spanish as a heritage 
language for many families, leading to a loss of identity, self-esteem, and 
ability to communicate with one’s familial elders.210 Due to the harmful 
impact of these policies, No-Spanish rules have been highly criticized and 
deemed an unfortunate racist relic of the past.211 
However, despite widespread renouncement of the practice, No-
Spanish public school rules have reemerged in the past two decades.212 Even 
when the rules are termed “English-only” rather than specifying Spanish, 
these language rules have focused on Spanish-speaking Latinos and are for 
all practical purposes No-Spanish rules.213 
The following three examples illustrate how English-only rules in 
schools are not race-neutral but are actually racially discriminatory and 
should be found to violate Title VI. These examples also demonstrate the 
need for Department of Education regulations addressing English-only 
school policies.  
In 2005, Zach Rubio, a bilingual Latino 16-year-old in Kansas City, 
Kansas, was on a break at school when a schoolmate passing in the hall asked 
to borrow a dollar in Spanish.214 Zach responded simply, “No problema.”215 
A teacher overheard the conversation and sent Zach to the principal’s office, 
where the principal ordered him to call his father and leave the school.216 The 
principal told Zach, “If you want to speak Spanish, go back to Mexico.”217 
Zach was suspended from school for speaking Spanish.218 
More recently, in November 2013,219 Amy Lacey, the principal at 
Hempstead Middle School in Hempstead, Texas, made an announcement 
over the intercom forbidding the entire school from speaking Spanish.220 
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Subsequently, teachers began to threaten students with punishment for 
speaking Spanish.221 The effect on the Latino children was considerable. 
Some students felt that the principal’s directive gave teachers and other 
students permission to discriminate against and harass them.222 Children 
became afraid to speak their native tongue and risk getting disciplined.223 One 
eighth grade student, Yedhany Gallegos, tried to explain to the principal that 
Spanish was her first language, and the principal responded by encouraging 
her to leave the school.224  
More than half of the students in the Hempstead district are Latino 
and many speak Spanish.225 As a result of these attacks on students’ language, 
the principal was suspended.226 Her suspension may have triggered a 
campaign to intimidate Latinos in the community.227 After taking disciplinary 
action against Ms. Lacey, the district’s superintendent, who is Latina, 
reported that strangers have watched and taken photos of her house; her yard 
was vandalized; and her garbage was searched.228 Vandals also damaged the 
brakes of three Hempstead school busses.229 These actions are a sign of the 
racial tensions related to the use of Spanish in this community. 
No-Spanish rules have also been extended by public schools to 
regulate communication off school grounds. In 2007, the Esmeralda County 
School District in Nevada made a rule prohibiting students from speaking 
Spanish on a school bus that transported Latino students who lived in the 
small farming and ranching community of Esmeralda to Tonopah High 
School in neighboring Nye County.230 The bus ride took approximately an 
hour and a half each way.231 There were other buses that transported students 
between Esmeralda County and Nye County, but students were free to speak 
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any language of their choice on those routes.232  
These stories show how English-only school rules are often not race-
neutral and, instead, discriminate on both the basis of national origin and race. 
In the Rubio case, Zach was suspended for uttering “no problema” instead of 
“no problem.” He was suspended on the basis of the Spanish vowel “a.” 
Interestingly, the phrase “no problema” is not actually Spanish. Rather it is 
slang combining the English “no problem” and the Spanish “no hay 
problema.”233 This “Spanglish” phrase, as well as its even less grammatically 
correct, “no problemo,” are commonly used by white Americans, often with 
anti-Hispanic sentiment.234 However, it is unheard of, and difficult to 
imagine, that a non-Latino would be suspended or otherwise disciplined for 
saying “No problema.” The racial and national origin animus against Latinos 
is obvious since Spanish was the only language targeted at that school. 
Further, the principal told Zach, “If you want to speak Spanish, go back to 
Mexico.” This is a racist statement, one that is common toward Latinos. Zach 
is an American citizen by birth; he cannot go “back” to Mexico. He is not 
from Mexico. He is from the United States. This statement was a racial attack. 
In Hempstead Middle School, the principal focused only on the Spanish 
language, going so far as to yell over the intercom that Spanish is not 
permitted on school grounds. On the school buses in Esmeralda County, only 
the bus traveling to a farming community with a significant population of 
Latinos was subject to the language ban. These three different English-only 
school rules were clearly No-Spanish rules aimed at targeting Latino 
children.  
 These instances indicate that No-Spanish rules in public schools are 
not merely a historic relic. Along with constitutional First Amendment 
claims,235 Title VI could be a vehicle to address such rules. Two types of Title 
VI violations are presented by English-only school rules: different treatment 
and hostile educational environment.236 Different treatment claims arise 
when a student is subject to an adverse educational action or otherwise 
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deprived of the ability to participate in or benefit from the educational 
program or activity provided by the school.237 This can occur, for example, 
when a Latino student is suspended from school for speaking Spanish. In such 
a case, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VI, the 
plaintiff must show that she is a member of a protected class; suffered an 
adverse action or deprivation; and that this adverse action or deprivation was 
taken because of race or national origin.238  
The second type of potential Title VI action concerns hostile learning 
environment.239 This applies when the actions taken by the school 
individually might not constitute a sufficient deprivation of participation or 
benefit but collectively the language-based national origin or racial 
harassment interferes with the student’s ability to participate in or benefit 
from the educational program or activities provided by the school.240 To 
prove a prima facie suit of hostile educational environment under Title VI, 
the plaintiff must show that she is part of a protected class; the harassment 
was implemented because of her race or national origin; the school actually 
knew or was deliberately indifferent to the harassment; and the harassment 
was so severe, pervasive, and offensive that the harassment denied plaintiff 
access to the educational benefits or opportunities provided by the school.241 
The detrimental effect of No-Spanish rules on Latino students has 
long been recognized.242 Not only are Latino students directly deprived of 
educational opportunities by having their education interrupted with 
discipline for speaking Spanish, English-only rules denigrate the culture and 
identity of Latino youth, instilling a sense of inferiority and fear.243 Self-
esteem, including cultural pride, and feelings of safety are vital for a child’s 
academic success.244 English-only school rules also encourage other 
expressions of race and national origin discrimination by administrators, 
teachers, and peers.245 The ban on Spanish is not only a direct attack on a 
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245 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 210–25.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2627306




central trait of the student’s identity, but it also becomes a proxy and pretext 
for expressing racial prejudice against Latinos. Hurtful comments, such as 
“Go back to Mexico”246 or telling a child she cannot touch a United States 
flag because they are not in Mexico,247 are thrust upon American students of 
Latino descent in English-only schools. As in the 1950s and 1960s, Spanish 
today is still considered a “dirty” and lowly language by some school 
administrations. This is suggested by how some schools have equated any 
Spanish use with bullying.248 A primary reason school administrators give for 
banning Spanish is a worry that foul, disrespectful, disruptive words will be 
used, even when there has been no factual basis for this concern.249 
Currently, there are no federal regulations or guidelines directing 
schools’ usage of English-only rules. The best practice would be to encourage 
a multicultural, multilingual environment that values diversity and prepares 
students for the realities of a multicultural and multilingual world where 
bilingualism and cross-cultural competence are valuable and profitable skills. 
However, as pedagogical determinations are usually made at the state and 
local level,250 at a minimum, the United States Department of Education 
should offer guidelines advising schools how to avoid Title VI violations. As 
a starting place, the guidelines could be modeled after the EEOC’s Title VII 
“Speak-English-only rules.”251  
As patterned after the EEOC’s Title VII national origin compliance 
“Speak-English-only rules,” English-only policies could only be established 
for a non-discriminatory purpose. Across the board bans on languages other 
than English (such as those that require only English to be spoken at all times 
on school premises) should be presumptively considered to violate Title VI. 
English-only rules should only be permissible if justified by educational 
necessity. Thus, it would be permissible to require that written or oral 
assignments be communicated in English, but a casual conversation between 
students during break time could not be subject to English-language 
restrictions. In evaluating whether to adopt an English-only rule, a school 
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district should weigh the educational justifications for the rule against 
possible discriminatory effects. Given the extensive racial history of language 
discrimination in schools, English-only policies in schools should be 
scrutinized closely to ensure that they do not advance discrimination or 
otherwise decrease the educational success of Latinos and other minority 
children.  
 
III. STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT: LIMITED 
SUCCESS IN REDRESSING LANGUAGE DISCRIMINATION 
 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was drafted primarily to address blatant 
racism against African Americans, but it has been interpreted more liberally 
to tackle race and national origin discrimination against diverse groups.252 
One of the Act’s significant steps toward racial equity has been its recognition 
that language discrimination can be a form of national origin or race 
discrimination. These language discrimination protections have outpaced 
legal protections under the United States Constitution, which has been slow 
to recognize the reality that language discrimination is often a method of or 
pretext for race, ethnic, or national origin discrimination. However, the Act 
has been ineffectual in redressing language inequity for at least three reasons.  
First, the federal government has established regulations concerning 
language discrimination, but some states have been reluctant to follow these 
regulations.253 Second, language protection under the Act has been 
inconsistent and incomplete254 due to a variety of factors, including resistance 
to recognizing the relationship between race and language.255 Finally, 
pursuant to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Act has been utilized 
as an excuse not to reach constitutional rulings that could establish broader 
language-based protection for minorities.256  
 
A.  State Resistance to Federal Regulations 
 
States have been reluctant to follow federal law and mandates with 
respect to language equality, as exemplified by their resistance to ensuring 
meaningful access to the courts for LEP persons. Title VI applies to state 
courts that receive federal financial assistance and, therefore, as discussed 
above, such courts are required to abide by Executive Order 13166 and the 
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DOJ’s LEP Guidance by ensuring that their programs are available to LEP 
individuals.257 Specifically, these state courts must provide interpretive 
services during all hearings, trials, and motions in which LEP individuals are 
present.258 Courts cannot charge LEP individuals for interpretive services and 
must ensure that the provided interpreters are competent.259  
Despite Title VI, Executive Order 13166, and the DOJ LEP 
regulations, LEP individuals continue to have limited access to and 
participation in the court system.260 Without an interpreter, LEP litigants are 
too often unable to fully understand court proceedings, making it impossible 
for them to “obtain restraining orders to protect them from domestic violence, 
argue for custody of their children, successfully fight against their family’s 
eviction, or compel employers to pay wages owed to them.”261 Further, LEP 
criminal defendants may not understand their own trials without an adequate 
interpreter.262 Despite the serious consequences for LEP litigants who are 
forced to proceed without sufficient language interpretation, LEP litigants 
continue to face significant barriers when it comes to accessing the 
courtroom.263 According to a recent study, approximately 46 percent of the 
states surveyed did not require that interpreters be provided in all civil cases; 
80 percent fail to guarantee that the court will pay for interpreters; and 37 
percent of the states that do provide interpreters fail to require the use of 
certified court interpreters.264 Executive Order 13166 and the DOJ LEP 
regulations have made it clear that beneficiaries and participants of federally 
funded court programs and activities are entitled to interpretive services and 
that failure to provide such interpretation may constitute a violation of Title 
VI.265 However, this statute and its regulations have not been sufficiently 
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Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding the Title VI Prohibition 
Against National Origin Discrimination Against LEP Persons 67 Fed. Reg. 41455 
(June 18, 2002). 
258 67 Fed. Reg. 41455, 41471 (June 18, 2002). 
259 Id. at 41462, 41471. 
260 See generally BRENNAN CTR. REPORT, supra note 137. 
261 Id. at 3. 
262 See id.; see also, e.g., Garcia v. State, 149 S.W.3d 135, 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2004) (finding that the failure to provide an interpreter for a Spanish-speaking 
criminal defendant violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
because, “One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation 
Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom during his trial,” and 
“[t]he right to be present includes the right to understand the testimony of the 
witnesses”) (internal citations omitted)).  
263 BRENNAN CTR. REPORT, supra note 137, at 1. 
264 Id.  
265 Id. at 8. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2627306
40                           LANGUAGE RIGHTS UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
  
 
enforced.266 Title VI-compliant interpretation programs should be more 
actively enforced to ensure equal access to court facilities for all persons, 
irrespective of English-language ability. 
 State resistance to Title VI mandates which require that LEP people 
be provided interpretation and adequate access to the courts is striking 
because the Act was drafted as a direct response to state refusal to follow 
federal antidiscrimination law. In the 1950s and 1960s, despite the landmark 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,267 the hope of desegregation was 
“dulled by resistance [from Southern states] to any but minimal steps toward 
compliance.”268 The failure of states to desegregate their schools and public 
accommodations led to various sit-ins and protests throughout the South.269 
Unfortunately, several whites did not heed the message of nonviolence. As 
images of “white violence inflicted upon nonviolent black protestors” 
permeated every media outlet, Congress was pressured to respond by passing 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.270 Congress’s 
intention is manifest in the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Records of floor debates in the Senate reflect that “the overriding purpose of 
the legislation was to alleviate the manifest problems of society-wide 
discrimination against African Americans” that occurred despite federal law 
and orders to the contrary.271  
 The failure of state courts to follow federal antidiscrimination law and 
regulations concerning LEP language access is an indicator that there has 
been less progress in the past fifty years in the realm of civil rights than many 
might believe or hope. Recent events targeting Latinos in the Southwest are 
eerily reminiscent of race discrimination in the South in the 1960s.272 The 
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Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its regulations can only be effective if they are 
enforced.  
B.  Inconsistent & Incomplete Language Protection under the Act 
 
 As outlined above, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been used to 
address language discrimination. However the treatment of such 
discrimination under the Act is inconsistent and incomplete. On one hand, 
the Act has been more forward thinking than other segments of law, such as 
constitutional jurisprudence, in recognizing the reality that native language is 
often a central constituent of national origin, and that discrimination on the 
basis of language can amount to national origin discrimination and possibly 
race discrimination.  
 The United States Supreme Court has not directly determined whether 
discrimination on the basis of language can constitute discrimination on the 
basis of national origin, race, or ethnicity under Equal Protection.273 In 
Hernandez v. New York, a plurality opinion and the Court’s most recent 
language discrimination case, the justices indicated a variety of views about 
the possible connection between language and race.274 In a concurring 
opinion by Justice O’Connor joined by Justice Scalia, Justice O’Connor 
stated that “[n]o matter how closely tied or significantly correlated to race the 
explanation for a peremptory strike may be, the strike does not implicate the 
Equal Protection Clause unless it is based on race.”275 Justice Kennedy 
indicated the opposite view that “[i]t may well be, for certain ethnic groups 
and in some communities, that proficiency in a particular language, like skin 
color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection 
analysis.”276 Currently, language restrictions and requirements are commonly 
subject to rational basis review, rather than the heightened scrutiny afforded 
restrictions based on race, ethnicity, and national origin.277 Further, unlike 
causes of action under Title VI and Title VII,278 disparate impact claims are 
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not recognized under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.279 As such, language discrimination claims are generally more 
difficult to assert under the Constitution than under the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. Therefore, the Act can be celebrated as a progressive advancement for 
language equity and, ultimately, racial justice.  
On the other hand, the lack of explicit mention of language in the text 
of the statute or its legislative history has made language protections under 
the Act uncertain and subject to attack, criticism, and inconsistent 
treatment.280 Language, as it relates to national origin, was only mentioned 
briefly in the Title VII bona fide occupation qualification exception 
context.281 It does not appear that Congress gave much consideration to either 
the substance or scope of the term “national origin,” much less to language, 
as the majority of legislative discussion of the Act focused on racial 
discrimination against African Americans.282 It is not surprising that 
discussions of the meaning of national origin under the Civil Rights Act were 
“quite meager” since African Americans were overwhelmingly born in the 
United States, were native English speakers, and thus did not experience 
discrimination on the basis of national origin or language.283  
With this backdrop, it is no surprise that antidiscrimination law is ill-
equipped to deal with racial discrimination against Latinos. This is not to 
imply in any way that existing law sufficiently addresses racial discrimination 
against African Americans. Rather, it is an observation that the static 
development and interpretation of civil rights law under a black-white binary 
paradigm of race often leaves Latinos without sufficient legal recourse to 
address discrimination. Under the black-white paradigm, non-black minority 
groups can only seek legal redress to the extent to which they can successfully 
analogize their experience to that of African Americans.284  
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Manifestations of racism against Latinos share some similarities with 
racism against African Americans, but there are two primary differences: 
language discrimination and perceived foreignness. Like African Americans, 
Latinos often experience racism based on skin color or phenotype, and they 
are the subject of derogatory racialized slurs. But unlike most discrimination 
against African Americans, discrimination against Latinos is expressed 
frequently in terms of language. Another principal expression of racism 
against Latinos is perceived foreignness; the assumption that, based on their 
race, minority persons are not “American” irrespective of how many 
generations of their families have lived in the United States or even whether 
they are indigenous to the land that is now part of the United States.285 In the 
case of Latinos, the majority are native-born United States citizens.286 In fact, 
many Chicanos never crossed the border, but rather the border crossed them 
as the result of the Mexican-American war in which the United States gained 
a third of its current land mass.287  
By recognizing language discrimination primarily under the national 
origin provisions of the Act rather than its race provisions, the Act 
perpetuates this perceived-foreignness problem. It ignores the fact that many 
targets of language discrimination are native born, multigenerational, and 
even indigenous Americans. In doing so, the Act seems to signal that 
language discrimination is an immigrant problem or a problem that relates to 
one’s foreign ancestry. It ignores the reality that, for many Latinos, language 
discrimination is race discrimination,288 thereby overlooking one of the 
principal ways in which Latinos experience racism. 
   
C. Constitutional Avoidance 
 
Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, courts have used the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a reason not to reach rulings that would establish 
constitutional protection for language minorities.289 Although this is not a 
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fault of the Civil Rights Act itself, it is a way the statute interacts with 
constitutional judicial decision-making that reduces the effectiveness of the 
Act’s protection against language discrimination. The doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance is a judicially created principle that a court should 
not reach a constitutional ruling if the matter could be decided on statutory 
grounds.290 This approach was applied in Lau v. Nichols.291 The United States 
Supreme Court’s finding that the failure to provide LEP students of Chinese 
descent ESL instruction amounted to a violation of Title VI on the basis of 
national origin or race provided grounds for not reaching the plaintiffs’ 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claims. Although a finding of a 
constitutional violation would not have necessarily directly benefited the Lau 
plaintiffs more than the Title VI ruling, it likely would have significantly 
advanced the rights of language minorities because Title VI and the other 
provisions of the Act are limited in their breadth of application and could be 





Fifty years after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this 
groundbreaking statute still remains significant in the struggle for racial 
justice. Despite some shortcomings and limitations, the Act has the potential 
to effectuate improved language equity and, in turn, greater racial equality. 
However, for this to be achieved we need to examine the racialized nature of 
English-language requirements with close scrutiny. Language is too often left 
out of the discussion of race and civil rights because it is deemed to be a 
legitimate, race-neutral basis upon which to discriminate. As this Article has 
argued, however, language is not race-neutral. It is race laden.  
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is often celebrated in retrospect. The 
Act’s present glory might be how, in a colorblind era, its interpretation has 
taken a relatively realistic analysis of language discrimination by recognizing 
that English-language requirements can amount to national origin 
discrimination. This clear-sighted view of the reality of language 
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discrimination should be expanded upon within the Civil Rights Act and 
adopted in other statutory and constitutional contexts to address modern day 
racism. “Like a virus that has mutated, racism has evolved into different 
forms that are more difficult not only to recognize but also to combat.”292 
Language restrictions in workplaces, schools, places of public 
accommodation, and courtrooms are contemporary symptoms of racism that 
work subtly to exclude and oppress Latinos and other persons of color. Civil 
rights laws need to be sufficiently adaptable to contend with ever-changing 
manifestations and expressions of racial subordination. The Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 has taken some small steps toward this end; perhaps if its gait were 
to invigorate, society would have something to truly celebrate in another fifty 
years. 
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